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Searching for misplaced keys around the house can be a 
frustrating, tiring, and time-consuming activity. For most 
people, habitual behaviours and a good memory probably 
offset this disruption, but for others, their ability to func-
tion efficiently in everyday search tasks is easily compro-
mised. Unlike small scale visual search (e.g., Wolfe, 1996), 
navigational search, in which the participant has to move 
through the environment to find the target, places a physi-
cal and cognitive demand on the searcher. Navigational 
search requires a goal focus (e.g., where are my keys most 
likely to be placed?) and resisting distraction (e.g., should 
I look for a spare set of keys?) or repetitious search errors 
(e.g., I’ll check my coat pocket yet again). As the decision 
to continue the search for keys (even in a previous loca-
tion) can be costly, cognitive control of monitoring goals 
and deploying attention to navigational search would seem 
important to search success. Here, we report two studies 
that probed the cognitive control of navigational search in 
a partially controlled laboratory environment that assessed 
search locations visited and search errors made across a 
relatively dense array of competing search locations.
Foraging refers to search for single or multiple targets 
across multiple locations where there are rewards associ-
ated with finding the target(s) (Stephens & Krebs, 1986). 
Foraging is a fundamental and central adaptive behaviour 
in all animals because it supports finding food and main-
tains reproductive success (Hill & Dunbar, 2002). 
Navigational search is a subtype of foraging in which the 
search is for a single target, and the reward is less directly 
linked to finding the target (c.f. finding food). A novel, 
automated paradigm has been developed to measure navi-
gational search in humans (Smith et al., 2005, 2007). In 
this paradigm, the goal is to find a single target location 
among multiple locations in a specially adapted floor in 
which is embedded an array of coloured lights. Using this 
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paradigm, visually guided navigational search was found 
to be a good analogue of visual search (Gilchrist et al., 
2001; Smith et al., 2007), although another variant of this 
paradigm where the target was hidden was not analogous 
to visually-guided search (Smith et al., 2005). In a study 
with children, Smith et al. (2005) asked participants to 
engage in navigational search for a hidden red target light. 
The target light was “hidden” under a green light and could 
only be activated by a simple switch (button press) at each 
potential location. In this hidden variant, navigational 
search showed fewer search errors to previously visited 
locations (revisits) compared with classic visual search 
(see also Gilchrist et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2008) implying 
that navigational search is not a simple corollary of visual 
search. Navigational search informs different search prob-
lems, such as exhaustive search for hidden targets in open 
ground (Riggs et al., 2017), or rummaging for unknown 
targets within complex environments (Riggs et al., 2018).
Successful human foraging is due, in part, to our ability 
to accrue learning-based knowledge to shape navigational 
search (Bock, 2004; Goldstone & Ashpole, 2004; Riggs 
et al., 2018). In the navigational search paradigm, effective 
search has been linked to an individual’s spatial working 
memory capacity and to their sensitivity to the probabilis-
tic likelihood of where the target is located over multiple 
trials (Smith et al., 2005, 2010). As noted by Smith et al., 
the ability to learn across multiple trials in this paradigm 
originates from the ability to remember and update both 
allocentric and egocentric visual representations of the 
search space in working memory during search (Smith 
et al., 2010). Working memory updating is valuable for 
learning about the characteristics of changing search envi-
ronments, but a broad range of automatic and controlled 
cognitive processes can also motivate search. Within the 
classic Norman–Shallice framework of attentional control 
of executive function (Norman & Shallice, 1986; Shallice 
& Burgess, 1996), an action schema, such as walking to a 
specific location, is familiar and can be activated in a rela-
tively automatic manner. When multiple action schemas 
compete, then inhibition and suppression of competing 
action schemas result in the activation of one “optimal” 
action schema. This framework further posits a Supervisory 
Attentional System that supports deliberate planning of 
action, with flexible use of strategies to generate novel, or 
non-habitual, action schemas. Experiment 1 reported here 
aimed to clarify the relation between cognitive control sys-
tems and navigational search.
To date, the automated navigational search paradigm 
has provided a range of evidence for the role of cognitive 
control in this class of tasks. Smith et al. (2005) found that 
children’s use of their non-dominant hand compromised 
search efficiency. Navigational search was less efficient 
when conflict arose between the resource demands of 
updating working memory to motivate search and the need 
to inhibit automatic and prepotent behaviour (using the 
dominant hand). Pellicano et al. (2011) observed fewer 
instances of systematic and optimal navigational search by 
children with Autistic Spectrum Disorder that was associ-
ated with their impaired performance on tasks which 
measured cognitive control. Finally, Longstaffe et al. 
(2014) identified three search indices presumed to require 
resource allocation: (a) the ability to direct attention to 
likely target locations, (b) the ability to remember previ-
ously visited locations, and (c) the ability to inhibit dis-
tracting information in the search array. Longstaffe et al. 
(2014, Experiment 1) explored perceptual salience of loca-
tions within the search space by having flashing and static 
lights at different locations across the search display. 
Having multiple search locations creates competition 
among different possible action schemas, the allocation of 
attentional resources to resolving this competition should 
improve success and efficiency of search. Likewise, any 
automatic re-direction of attention towards the perceptu-
ally salient flashing locations would have consequences 
for resolving conflict between action schemas. Longstaffe 
et al. found that the presence of perceptual salient flashing 
locations increased the likelihood of revisits to previously 
visited locations. By assuming that working memory sup-
ports the retention of spatial co-ordinates (i.e., maps) of 
possible locations, one explanation was that the effortful 
“tagging” of visited locations allows an updated record of 
the search space (for active and visited locations) to be 
maintained. These data implied that the allocation of atten-
tion to salient flashing locations impinged on the ability to 
update working memory after a search event, and therefore 
maintain search efficiency.
In a further study, Longstaffe et al. (2014, Experiment 
2) found that the salience effects on search errors were 
diminished when the illuminated locations were extin-
guished after being visited. Assuming effortful “tagging” 
of visited locations placed demands on working memory 
updating under conditions of continued illumination, then 
these visited locations were no longer required to be 
“tagged” when lights were extinguished. This manipula-
tion increased the cognitive resources available for retain-
ing and updating the search display leading to more 
efficient search. Longstaffe et al. (2014) therefore posited 
evidence in favour of a single resource-driven account of 
navigational search where search at perceptually salient 
locations competes for common resources that are shared 
with the working memory load of retaining visuo-spatial 
locations within the search display. One problem with this 
account is that it fails to consider “higher level” processes 
of supervisory control that facilitate strategic governance 
of navigational search, and distinguish these from 
resources for “lower level” processes that automatically 
resolve interference between competing action schemas to 
select the most optimal action schema. Certainly, our eve-
ryday experience suggests that explicit rules do motivate 
search (e.g., my keys are kept on the hook).
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One contemporary theory of cognitive control (dual-
mechanisms control theory; Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 
2007, 2009) builds on the classic formulation of different 
components of control within the Norman–Shallice atten-
tional framework. This model postulates two distinct mech-
anisms of proactive and reactive control. Proactive control 
orients to the goal-relevant information that biases action, 
perception, and attention systems to maintain the goal-rele-
vant behaviour (Miller & Cohen, 2001). As such, proactive 
control reflects the sustained maintenance of goal-relevant 
information in an anticipatory fashion. By contrast, reac-
tive control is transient and stimulus-driven and can occur 
post-event to direct goal re-activation. It incorporates inter-
ference demands and episodic associations with the context 
of event stimuli and goal activity. Behavioural evidence for 
the dual-mechanisms framework of cognitive control 
comes from a range of cognitive tasks including variants of 
the Stroop task and task switching (Bugg & Braver, 2016; 
Gonthier et al., 2016) and the AX-Continuous Performance 
Task (AX-CPT; Cohen et al., 1999; MacDonald, 2008) 
which we use in Experiment 2 of the current study.
Experiment 1 aimed to explore the utility of a dual-
mechanisms account of cognitive control in accounting for 
performance in the navigational search paradigm. To do 
this, a rule-manipulation was implemented at the start of 
search, and the perceptual salience of search locations was 
manipulated by having both “flashing” or “non-flashing” 
locations in the search array. Extending the dual-
mechanisms account to navigational search, proactive 
control implies search behaviour is sensitive to explicit 
rules (provided before search commences) by allocating 
resources to sustaining a rule, and by minimising distrac-
tion to adhere to a rule. For each participant, two rule 
manipulations were introduced, participants were told at 
the start of each block that either (A) the target was more 
likely to be at a non-flashing (static) location or (B) the 
target was more likely to be at a flashing location. Here, 
the a-priori rule was directly linked to the perceptual sali-
ence of locations, not other aspects of the search display. If 
proactive control facilitates the maintenance of the a-priori 
rule to minimise distraction, then rule-congruent search 
should occur as participants (a) attend to the perceptual 
salience of the display and (b) resolve the cognitive 
demands of resisting competing action schemas to alterna-
tive locations, predicting more button presses at rule-con-
gruent locations, that is, more presses to static locations 
under Rule A and more presses at flashing locations under 
Rule B. These predictions differ from a simpler hypothesis 
that only the perceptual salience of the display orients nav-
igational search leading to more button presses at the sali-
ent flashing locations, irrespective of the rule.
The second feature of search behaviour in this task is 
revisiting previously searched locations; revisits are costly 
search errors with respect to the goal of finding the target. 
The findings of Longstaffe et al., (2014) that increasing the 
uncertainty of whether a location had been visited or not 
(e.g., by keeping targets switched on after a search event) 
increased revisits, but not the overall number of button 
presses, implying different factors influence these meas-
ures. According to a dual-mechanisms cognitive control 
account, reactive control corresponds to late-stage recruit-
ment of resources to respond to new information by moni-
toring stimuli-driven aspects of the display and to re-instate 
the goal. Each search event (of reaching down to check a 
specific target) potentially increases the need to engage 
reactive control to monitor the information provided at the 
search location, for example, by actively updating working 
memory, and to re-instate the search goal by resolving com-
petition between multiple action schemas. If the demands 
for reactive control increase, then updating working mem-
ory and goal-reinstatement will be compromised by dimin-
ished proactive control and more search errors will be 
made. As the allocation of reactive control is a direct 
response to stimuli and context, flashing locations will 
induce more conflict between different action schemas, 
influencing activity towards these locations. Under a reac-
tive control hypothesis, we predict that participants will 
make more revisits to flashing search locations, and more 
revisits under the flashing rule that requires monitoring of 
flashing locations, as search efficiency is compromised.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. A total of 47 participants (20 males, 27 
females) were recruited as undergraduate volunteers, with 
participation in lieu of course credits. All participants gave 
informed written consent and were debriefed about the 
experiment. The study was approved by the local ethics 
committee. All participants self-reported no hearing prob-
lems and an average level of fitness.
Task design and materials
Automated navigational search paradigm. The paradigm 
consisted of a darkened room in a dedicated 4 × 4 m2 
space surrounded by black featureless curtains so that all 
discernible landmarks were removed. The space containing 
49 search locations embedded in the floor in a honeycomb 
arrangement. Each search location consisted of a steel but-
ton (diameter = 2.5 cm) surrounded in a ring of light-emit-
ting diodes (LEDs, diameter = 6 cm). The centre of each 
light was 38 cm from the centre of the adjoining light on 
each side and 50 cm from the nearest light in a circular tra-
jectory around the border. One location was consistently lit 
as orange at the start of each trial to identify a starting loca-
tion. A set of 20 active search locations were lit green and 
were selected randomly from the array of possible locations 
on each trial. Of these, 10 locations were selected to flash in 
the salience manipulation (see Figure 1).
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The flashing lights alternated at less than 2 Hz to mini-
mise the risk of epileptic seizure (Bancaud et al., 1981) 
and alternated at varying frequencies to ensure that the set 
did not flash in a synchronised manner. The viewing range 
of locations depends on their head and body orientation at 
any given time. Each trial began at the same start location 
as indicated by an orange LED and commenced with a sin-
gle button press at this location. Participants were then 
required to engage in navigational search for a hidden tar-
get and inspect locations with a button press to the centre 
of a single green, illuminated LED. The target was “found” 
when the colour at the location switched from green to red 
when the location was “inspected.” All non-target loca-
tions remained illuminated as green after inspection. The 
trial ended when the target location was found. The search 
task consisted of two blocks of 20 search trials. For each 
block, participants were provided with one rule (of two) to 
bias their knowledge of the likely location of the target. 
Under Rule A, participants were told that 60% of the tar-
gets would be at static locations across the block. Under 
Rule B, participants were told that 60% of the targets 
would be at flashing locations across the block. The order 
of presentation of rules was counterbalanced. Search 
behaviour was measured by the number of button presses 
overall and the number of revisits to previously searched 
locations on each trial.
Procedure. Participants attended a single test session that 
was split between a dedicated navigational search room 
and an adjoining laboratory room. On entering the search 
room, participants were introduced to the search array and 
informed that all non-illuminated buttons served no func-
tion and that each trial had only one stationary target, 
indexed by a switch from a green to red light when pressed. 
Participants were instructed on the goal of searching across 
the illuminated locations, at their own pace, to determine 
the location of the hidden red target. Participants were then 
positioned in the starting location such that all locations in 
the search array were visible. At the beginning of each 
block, participants were informed of a specific rule regard-
ing the likely location of the target. The experimenter then 
vacated the room and instructed the participant from out-
side the room, with access via remote camera, to com-
mence the trial. After the start button was activated, 
participants walked through the search array and pressed 
illuminated locations until the target location was identi-
fied. On finding the target location, the search array was 
reset and the participant was instructed to return to the 
starting position for the following trial. Participants were 
offered a short break between the two blocks, and were 
advised of the second rule, prior to the second block. Over-
all testing time was approximately 40 min and participants 
were fully debriefed.
Data analysis. Using JASP (The JASP Team, 2018), data 
sets were examined with analysis of variance (ANOVA).
Results
Figure 2a illustrates the effect of the rule on the relative 
number of button presses to flashing and no-flashing loca-
tions. The red line indicates the balance point in which the 
number of presses to flashing and non-flashing locations is 
matched. Overall, the trend is for button presses to be con-
gruent with rule. To test the specific prediction of rule-con-
gruent navigation in the overall button presses, one-way 
comparisons were conducted for presses at flashing loca-
tions under each rule. For the flashing Rule B, more button 
presses were made to flashing locations, M = 0.53, 
t0.5(45) = 3.17, p < .01, Cohen’s d  = .47, 95% CI = [0.16, 
0.77]. For the static Rule A, fewer button presses were made 
to flashing locations although this approximated to chance 
performance, M = 0.48, t0.5(45) = −1.26, p = .18, Cohen’s 
d  =  −.17, 95% CI = [−.48, 0.11]. There was evidence for 
rule-adherent search at flashing locations when implement-
ing the flashing rule. If rule-adherence to the flashing rule is 
governed by the ability to maintain the rule in working 
memory, then the length of search could influence the prob-
ability of maintaining the rule in memory. That is, longer 
search durations could impede the likelihood of maintaining 
rule-governed behaviour. To probe this, search time to locate 
the target were extracted on a trial-by-trial basis across con-
ditions, for each person. Trials with Slow and Fast search 
times were categorised based on a median split for each per-
son (Mslow = 30 s and Mfast = 9.7 s) and within each condition. 
If rule-adherence to the flashing rule can only be maintained 
over short durations, then we anticipated a rule × speed 
interaction, where the advantage for maintaining the flash-
ing rule would be evident in the Fast trials only. To test this, 
Figure 1. Example trial in the navigational search space with 
locations displayed as flashing (dark grey dot pattern), static 
(light grey), and the starting location (in black).
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a 2 (rule; A or B) × 2 (salience of target location; Flashing 
or Static location) × 2 (search duration; Fast or Slow trials) 
ANOVA (Type III) was conducted on search time. Search 
times were not significantly faster according to rule A or B, 
F(1, 45) = 3.42, p = .07, ηp
2 003= . , and not faster for search 
at flashing target locations, F(1, 45) = 2.67, p = .11, ηp
2 001= .
, and not specifically faster under the flashing rule at salient 
locations, F(1, 45) = .74, p = .39, ηp
2 001= . . Critically, there 
was evidence that search times were slower under the flash-
ing rule, but only within the longer trials, F(1, 45) = 4.47, 
p = .04, ηp
2 002= . , and there was no three-way rule × loca-
tion interaction with trial duration, F(1, 45) = 1.93, p = .17, 
ηp
2 002= . . Overall, there was no evidence that adhering to 
the flashing rule was sensitive to the overall search time.
Figure 2b plots the proportion of revisits by rule. There 
were both more revisits under the flashing rule and more 
revisits to flashing locations. In a 2 (rule; A and B) × 2 
(salience of target location; Flashing and Static) repeated 
measures ANOVA (Type III) on the proportion of revisits, 
there were significantly more revisits under the flashing 
rule, compared with static rule, F(46) = 4.64, p = .04, 
ηp
2 09= . , and more revisits to salient flashing locations 
than the static locations, F(46) = 5.96, p = .019, ηp
2 11= . , 
but no significant interaction of rule × salience of target 
location, F(46) = .29, p = .590, ηp
2 006= . .
Discussion
The role of proactive and reactive control in navigational 
search was investigated by manipulating the a-priori goal 
and the salience of search locations in the display. We used 
the overall proportion of button presses and the proportion 
of revisits as measures of navigational search performance. 
The findings were consistent with a dual-mechanism 
account of cognitive control (Braver, 2012) that distin-
guishes proactive and reactive control, and provides a 
novel interpretation framework for navigational search 
behaviour. Proactive control was anticipated to govern 
navigational search by supporting participant’s adherence 
to an a-priori rule and so leading to participants pressing 
buttons at spatial locations congruent with the rule. The 
findings provided evidence for rule-adherence in search, 
when the rule specified the target was more likely at flash-
ing locations. For revisits to previous locations, there was 
evidence that instigating the flashing rule led to more 
revisits overall (irrespective of location) consistent with 
reactive control. There was no evidence that search dura-
tions varied systematically across conditions or that the 
sensitivity of search durations to the flashing rule occurred 
only for faster trials. Navigational search times almost cer-
tainly tap into the participant’s agility and motoric fitness 
and so should not be considered similar to search times in 
visual search tasks. Specifically, the duration of naviga-
tional search times corresponds largely to time spent trav-
elling between locations, not time allocated to a specific 
location. Since search times were not directly sensitive to 
the salience of display characteristics, then the allocation 
of cognitive control in guiding search behaviour can offer 
a valuable explanation beyond describing navigational 
search as a function of the display.
Although the dual-mechanisms account offers an inter-
esting explanatory account of search patterns, we acknowl-
edge the limits of post hoc interpretation of these search 
data. To address this, Experiment 2 aimed to provide evi-
dence of associations between navigational search and dual 
mechanisms of cognitive control, as indexed by the Dot 
Pattern Expectancy (DPE) task. This task is commonly 
used to identify control modes (Lopez-Garcia et al., 2016; 
Figure 2. Displays the average proportions of (a) button presses and (b) revisits generated under a probabilistic rule for locating 
targets at static (Rule A) and flashing locations (Rule B). (a) Boxplots for flashing locations only due to non-independence. (b) 
Revisits as a function of the salience of search locations.
Error bars shown as 95% confidence intervals (CIs).
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MacDonald, 2008; MacDonald et al., 2005; also meta-anal-
ysis by Janowich & Cavanagh, 2018). As a variant of the 
expectancy-CPT (Cohen et al., 1999; MacDonald, 2008; 
MacDonald et al., 2005), the DPE uses visual patterns of 
simple dot arrays as cues and probes (instead of familiar 
letters) and was developed to be more appropriate for high-
functioning individuals and non-clinical populations 
(Lopez-Garcia et al., 2016). The DPE task requires partici-
pants to distinguish one target pairing of a cue–probe asso-
ciation (e.g., cue A–probe X) from among three types of 
alternative (non-target) cue-probe pairs that are all pre-
sented in a continuous sequential stream. As a monitoring 
task, participants need to maintain cognitive control for 
detecting and implementing positive identification of the 
target (e.g., cue A–probe X) and negative responses to the 
non-target pairs (e.g., cue B followed by probe Y as a non-
target baseline). Critically, the target (A-X) pair is high fre-
quency (typically 65%–70% of cue–probe associations) 
compared with non-target pairings; this generates a strong 
associative and prepotent response tendency for positive 
identification of A-X pairs.
Dual-mechanisms control on the DPE task is evident 
from responses to non-target “interference” trials, for 
example, when cue A is followed by probe Y (A-Y pairing) 
or when cue B is followed by probe X (B-X pairing). 
Proactive control co-ordinates the anticipatory mainte-
nance of a goal, such as determining a correct response 
only to the A-X pairs. After presentation of an A-cue, the 
A-Y pairing generates conflict between anticipation of an 
X-probe, and negative response to the Y-probe. This gen-
erates errors and/or longer latencies of responses to the 
non-target A-Y pairing, as evidence of proactive control 
mode. Reactive control governs the late-onset allocation of 
resources to resolve a response in the event of detecting 
the stimuli and facilitates re-instatement of the goal. For 
the non-target baseline (B-Y pairing), response certainty is 
high given low conflict with the target A-X pair, but a non-
target X probe (in B-X pairings) will generate conflict that 
is resolved by late-stage allocation of reactive control 
mode. As patterns of errors and response latencies distin-
guish the A-Y and B-X pairings from the target (A-X) and 
baseline (A-Y) trials, individual biases for control mode 
can be derived. Individual bias scores for proactive and 
reactive control mode will be used to identify a more direct 
association between navigational search and a DPE task 
that taps dual mechanisms of cognitive control.
Experiment 2
First, we aimed to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 
using an identical navigational search task. To provide 
more direct evidence for the involvement of proactive and 
reactive control in this task, we hypothesise that individu-
als with a bias for engaging reactive control mode would 
make more revisits, compared with their peers who are 
biased to engage proactive control mode to maintain the 
rule and update working memory. Although individual 
bias for a dominant control mode was not established for 
participants in Experiment 1, one could posit a general 
bias for proactive control mode is most likely for these 
healthy young adults (18–30 years) compared with younger 
children and slightly older healthy adults (40–45 years) 
who perform more in reactive mode (Chatham et al., 2009; 
Janowich & Cavanagh, 2018). Both modes of control were 
evident from the rule-congruence of button presses and the 
strong bias for revisits under the flashing rule. For indi-
viduals with dominant proactive control, their bias for 
maintaining the rule predicts a stronger tendency for more 
button presses to rule-congruent locations, compared with 
reactive control mode.
Exploratory analysis of revisits in relation to rule-
adherence and distraction by flashing locations will be 
compared for individuals who vary in their bias for proac-
tive and reactive control. Where proactive control is domi-
nant, revisits were hypothesised to be more likely at 
rule-congruent locations in accordance with maintenance 
of the probabilistic rule, implying no strong bias for either 
rule or location. If reactive control mode is dominant, 
revisits will be less sensitive to rule-adherence (with 
diminished proactive control) but more allocation of 
resources to perceptual monitoring of the display. Together, 
these factors imply that reactive control is more likely to 
generate conflict between orienting to the more salient 
(flashing) locations, and re-instating the search goal, lead-
ing to more search errors at the flashing locations com-
pared with individuals in proactive control mode.
Method
Participants. A total of 47 participants (9 males, 38 females) 
were recruited as undergraduate volunteers, with partici-
pation in lieu of course credits. All participants gave 
informed written consent and were debriefed about the 
experiment, and the study was approved by a local ethics 
committee. All participants self-reported no hearing, or 
cardiovascular problems and an average level of fitness.
Task design and materials
Automated navigational search paradigm. The search task 
was identical to Experiment 1.
Mouse-tracking variant of DPE task. For the DPE task, 
a novel mouse-tracking variant was developed using 
MouseTracker Analyzer™ software (Freeman, 2018; 
Freeman & Ambady, 2010; Freeman et al., 2011) to give 
a dynamic component to responses to the visual stimuli 
while drawing on visuo-spatial processing and long-term 
memory: cognitive abilities that also contribute to naviga-
tional search behaviour. On each trial, a visual-spatial (A 
or B) cue preceded a visual-spatial (X or Y) probe. Four 
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trial-types (A-X, A-Y, B-X, B-Y) were included to reflect 
different cue-probe combinations and presented in the fol-
lowing distribution (A-X, 60%; A-Y, 15%; B-X, 15%; and 
B-Y, 10%). In total, 10 practice trials preceded 40 trials 
presented in a randomised order. The A cues consisted of a 
vertical row of three filled black circles. Two B-cue vari-
ants were used with either four or five white circles. The 
X-probes consisted of three circles (two blue, one white). 
The Y-probes comprised two rotated variants of X-probes 
(see Figure 3).
For each trial, dynamic motion of a hand-held computer 
mouse from an onscreen “start button” towards a Yes/No 
target box at the top right and left corners of the screen 
were recorded. Although mouse trajectories can give 
insights to the evolving dynamic competition during deci-
sion-making (Fischer & Hartmann, 2014; Spivey & Dale, 
2006); here, errors and response latencies are reported and 
used to derive individual preferences for proactive or reac-
tive control.
Procedure. Participants attended a single test session of 
approximately 50 min that was split between a room with 
dedicated search apparatus and an adjoining laboratory. 
For all participants, the DPE task was administered, fol-
lowed by the automated navigational search task. Each 
DPE trial started with a 300-ms cue stimuli (A or B), fol-
lowed by a 2,000-ms delay interval, prior to presentation 
of a 300-ms probe stimuli (X or Y). Participants were 
instructed to respond “Yes” to a “correct” A-X pairing, and 
that they should generate a “No” response to any other 
stimuli pairings (as an “incorrect” pairing). Participants 
were told to respond as quickly and accurately as possible 
by clicking the onscreen (START) button centred in the 
lower middle of the screen that released the mouse for data 
recording and then clicking their response at one of two 
locations in the top left- and right-hand corners of the dis-
play. The response window was set to 6,000 ms, after 
which participants received a time-out reminder to start 
moving earlier, even if they were unsure of their response.
Data handling. As in Experiment 1, data from the naviga-
tional search task were examined with ANOVA using 
JASP (JASP Team, 2018). For the DPE task, errors and 
response latencies were obtained from analysis conducted 
within MouseTracker Analyzer software (Freeman & 
Ambady, 2010; Freeman et al., 2011). Due to data record-
ing errors, navigational search data from one participant 
and three from the DPE task data were unavailable.
Results
Navigational search. Similar to Experiment 1, the propor-
tion of correct button presses was explored under two 
manipulations; by rules (A and B; 60% likely under static 
and flashing locations respectively) and by salience of the 
target location (either flashing or static locations). Figure 4 
illustrates a search bias in the proportion of button presses 
made consistent with both rules.
Figure 3. Example trials for four cue-probe associations, where A and B cues (and also X-probes) represented by one single dot 
array, but Y probes represented by two discrete dot patterns (shown here in A-Y and B-Y pairs) that occurred equally often with A 
and B cues. Intervals between pairings were 1,000 ms, with a 6,000-ms response window.
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Consistent with the findings of Experiment 1, Figure 4a 
shows button presses were made to flashing locations that 
aligned with, or against, the flashing and static rules 
respectively. To test for rule-congruent navigation, one-
way comparisons were conducted for button presses at 
flashing locations under each rule. For the flashing rule B, 
more button presses were made to flashing locations, 
t0.5(45) = 4.95, p < .001, Cohen’s d  =  .73, 95% CI = [0.40, 
1.05], and for the static Rule A, fewer button presses were 
made to flashing locations than expected by chance, 
t0.5(45) = −4.01, p < .001, Cohen’s d  =  −.59, 95% 
CI = [−0.90, −0.27]. Consistent with Experiment 1, there 
was strong evidence for rule-adherence, consistent with 
proactive control mode.
Figure 4b plots the effect of both salience and rule on 
the proportion of revisits. A 2 (rule type) × 2 (salience of 
target location) ANOVA (Type III) identified no main 
effect of either rule type, Rule A versus Rule B, F(1, 
45) = 0.31, p = .58, ηp
2 00= . , or salience of target location, 
Flashing versus Static, F(1, 45) = 2.59, p = .11, ηp
2 05= . , 
on revisits, but there was a significant interaction of rule 
with the salience of target locations, F(1, 45) = 4.36, 
p = .042, ηp
2 09= . , that implied more revisits to the flash-
ing locations under the (flashing) Rule B.
Dual-mechanisms control on the DPE task. For the DPE task 
the proportional error rates was low across all trial types 
(MAX = 0.01, MAY = 0.02, MBX = 0.05, MBY = 0.01) and so 
were not analysed further. Response latencies (within 3 SD 
of the condition mean) were slower than typically reported 
on expectancy tasks (~1,300 ms). Responses to AX trials 
(MAX = 1240, SDAX = 176) appeared faster than latencies for 
non-target trials (MAX = 1372, SDAX = 249; MBX = 1289, 
SDBX = 226; MBX = 1341, SDBY = 284) consistent with the 
strong expectancy established for the AX targets. Critically, a 
planned comparison of latencies for the AX-AY contrast 
favoured longer latencies for the AY trials; tAX-AX(43) = 4.2, 
p < .001, d = .63, that implicated interference from proactive 
control, despite the need to engage reactive control for suc-
cessful resolution of late-stage conflict between the AX 
expectancy and the Y probe (Braver et al., 2009; Janowich & 
Cavanagh, 2018). Similarly, for the BX trials, the B cue 
invokes proactive control for the preparation of a non-target 
response, but where the late-onset of the X-probe creates 
conflict, and therefore interference from reactive control 
induces more error and slower latencies relative to AX and 
BY trials. Response latencies on BX trials were significantly 
slower than AX trials, tBX-AX(43) = 1.74, p < .05, d = .26, but 
not compared with the latencies for BY trials, tBX-
BX(43) = −1.3, p = .89, d = −.19, giving only anecdotal evi-
dence for slowing on the BX trials. Since the overall pattern 
of slowing was consistent across the exception (non-target) 
trials, the critical contrast of AY-BX latencies was used to 
capture the balance between proactive and reactive control 
modes within individuals using the Behavioural Shift Index 
(Braver et al., 2009; Janowich & Cavanagh, 2018), calcu-
lated as (MAX – MAY)/(MAX + MAY) from response latencies.
Individual variation in control mode and rule-adherence in 
search behaviour. Participants were split into two sub-
groups with a bias for proactive (n = 27) and reactive 
(n = 16) control modes in the DPE task, using the Behav-
ioural Shift Index to determine whether a dominant control 
mode predicted variation in the navigational search task. 
Figure 4. The average proportions of (a) button presses and (b) revisits generated under a probabilistic rule for locating targets 
at static (Rule A) and flashing locations (Rule B). (a) Boxplots for flashing locations only due to non-independence. (b) Revisits as a 
function of the salience of search locations.
Error bars shown as 95% confidence intervals (CIs).
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Figure 5 plots the proportion of button presses to flashing 
and static locations, for both subgroups, for the corre-
sponding rules. In both subgroups, there was a general bias 
to search at locations congruent with the rule.
As shown in Figure 5a, under the flashing Rule B, both 
subgroups showed a preference for flashing locations (pro-
active M = 0.53, SD = 0.04; reactive M = 0.52, SD = 0.04) 
with little evidence of a group difference, t = 0.52, p = .60, 
d = .16. As shown in Figure 5b, under the static Rule A, 
both subgroups showed a preference for static locations 
(proactive M = 0.48, SD = 0.04; reactive M = 0.48, 
SD = 0.03) with no evidence of a group difference, 
t = −0.19, p = .88, d = −.06. A general tendency for rule-
congruence was evident in both subgroups.
Individual variation in control mode and revisits as search 
errors. For the revisits, the two subgroups appeared to vary 
in their sensitivity to the a-priori rule, with more revisits in 
the proactive subgroup under the flashing rule, as shown in 
Figure 6.
Figure 6b displays a trend for more revisits under the 
flashing rule for the reactive group, compared with the pro-
active group (6a). In a 2 (group) × 2 (rule) × 2 (salience of 
target locations) ANOVA (Type III) for group (Reactive vs. 
Proactive) by rule (A or B) and salience (Flashing vs. Static 
locations) on the proportion of revisits, the groups were 
matched for the amount of revisits overall, F(1, 41) > 1, 
p = .36, ηp
2 02= . . There was no significant main effects of 
either rule, F(1, 41) > 1, p = .36, ηp
2 02= . , or salience of 
Figure 5. Boxplots of the proportion of rule-congruent button presses to flashing locations (as 60% more likely under the flashing 
Rule B and to static locations (as 60% more likely under the static Rule A) for the (a) proactive and (b) reactive subgroups.
location, F(1, 41) > 1, p = .36, ηp
2 02= . , or an interaction of 
rule and salience, F(1, 41) > 1, p = .82, ηp
2 00= . . A signifi-
cant two-way interaction of group × rule indicated that the 
reactive group were more likely to revisit locations under 
the flashing rule compared to the proactive group, F(1, 
41) = 5.69, p < .05, ηp
2 12= . . Despite this, there was no 
evidence of a significant three-way interaction that differed 
by group, F(1, 41) > 1, p = .52, ηp
2 00= . .
Summary of findings
In this replication of Experiment 1, the effects of the rule 
manipulation on button presses in the automated naviga-
tional search paradigm reflected a strong tendency for rule-
adherence. That is, the button presses were more likely at 
static locations under the static rule and more button presses 
to flashing locations occurred under the flashing rule. A 
slightly different pattern was observed for revisits in 
Experiment 2 compared with Experiment 1. Revisits were 
more likely only to (rule-congruent) flashing locations 
under the flashing rule in Experiment 2. This did not repli-
cate the findings of Experiment 1, where revisits were more 
likely under the flashing rule (and to flashing locations over-
all) but were not biased only to rule-congruent locations.
Experiment 2 further sought to provide a clearer associa-
tion between the dual-mechanisms account of cognitive 
control and navigational search, by focussing on individual 
bias for proactive and reactive control modes. The novel 
variant of the DPE task captured dual-mechanisms of 
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control embedded in motor behaviour and was used as a 
basis for relating individual differences in dual-mechanisms 
of control to navigational search behaviour. In the context of 
monitoring a highly frequent response schedule for the tar-
get A-X pairs, proactive control was captured by longer 
latencies on the A-Y trials, relative to A-X trials, as indica-
tive of conflict between the anticipatory maintenance of a 
target response (elicited by an A-cue) and reactive control of 
responses towards a non-target (to successfully respond to 
the Y-probe). Some slowing on the BX trials was evident 
relative to the A-X pairs, with more atypical slowing on the 
BY trials than was anticipated. The Behavoural Shift Index 
was used to estimate individual bias using the contrast of 
AY-BX trial latencies to determine the balance of control 
modes. Typical of the undergraduate population sampled, 
more participants were characterised by proactive control 
mode than reactive control mode. Group sizes were suffi-
cient to compare these groups for distinct patterns of naviga-
tional search behaviour. Participants in both reactive and 
proactive control modes demonstrated rule-adherence so 
that button presses were more likely to occur in locations 
that corresponded to an a-priori rule. Contrary to the predic-
tion that the proactive subgroup would show a stronger bias 
for rule-adherence, the degree of rule-adherence was well-
matched across subgroups. Interestingly, the reactive sub-
group did not engage simply with pressing buttons at the 
more salient (flashing locations) in the display, rather, they 
too showed rule-adherence when responding with button 
presses at static locations that were less salient under the 
corresponding rule.
A final prediction was that the groups would vary in the 
pattern of revisits with the proactive group generating 
search errors at rule-congruent locations in accordance 
with maintenance of the probabilistic rule. Interestingly, 
the proactive group responded to the revisiting of search 
locations in a relatively unbiased way, suggesting that they 
were less sensitive to features of the display that were 
more salient. The reactive group showed greater suscepti-
bility to revisits under the flashing rule where a salient fea-
ture of the display converged with the implementation of 
the (flashing) rule. Search errors were distributed across 
both static and flashing locations; only the implementation 
of the flashing rule influenced the proportional increase in 
behaviour towards flashing locations for individuals in 
reactive control mode. Across two experiments, the labile 
distribution of revisits in relation to the rule and perceptual 
aspects of the display points to the importance of individ-
ual differences. Notably, the sensitivity of search errors to 
the imposition of the flashing rule in the reactive group 
corresponded closely to the pattern of revisits seen in 
Experiment 1. This suggested a high proportion of indi-
viduals in reactive control mode were sampled in the first 
experiment.
General discussion
Earlier studies of navigational search have proposed a role 
for cognitive control in the search behaviour of typical 
adults (Longstaffe et al., 2014) and children with autism 
(Pellicano et al., 2011). In the present experiments, partici-
pants were given an a-priori rule at the start of each block 
of trials. Registering and maintaining a probabilistic rule 
requires allocation of working memory resources prior to, 
and potentially during, navigational search. That is, the 
rule could be maintained before, and re-instated after, each 
search event, to guide search behaviour. An active search 
event in the task means that participants stop, reach down 
and press the button to determine whether that location 
reveals the target or not. It is likely that the combination of 
“stopping to search,” updating of any representation of the 
Figure 6. Displays revisits as a function of the rule and salience of search locations for the (a) proactive and (b) reactive 
subgroups.
Error bars shown as 95% confidence intervals (CIs).
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spatial array for non-target locations and the re-instatement 
of the goal will engage cognitive control. Revisits are 
search errors to previously visited locations, presumably 
as a consequence of a failure of sufficient “tagging” of vis-
ited locations in working memory for the spatial array (see 
also Longstaffe et al., 2014). The question is how and 
when does navigational search require cognitive resources, 
especially in this paradigm, that combines the knowledge 
of a probabilistic rule with varying perceptual salience of 
the search environment.
Simple explanations of search behaviour that are deter-
mined either by the rule or by the perceptual salience of the 
display can be ruled out. That is, search was not driven 
only by the perceptual salience of locations that com-
manded attention, and so directed search behaviour to 
those locations or by the rule alone. In two experiments, 
button presses were biased towards the search locations 
congruent with the rule, rather than features of the display 
per se. Some evidence from Experiment 1 suggested the 
flashing locations were revisited more often as search 
errors, indicating some search bias towards those loca-
tions, however this was not observed in Experiment 2. 
Critically, revisits were more likely to be influenced by an 
a-priori rule to search flashing locations. This finding 
partly concurred with Longstaffe et al. (2014) where more 
search error (indexed by revisits) occurred when there was 
uncertainty about which locations had been previously vis-
ited (i.e., when lights did not extinguish after a button 
press). Since the tendency to make search errors was 
stronger in relation to the (flashing) rule, rather than loca-
tion, the origin of search errors was likely to stem from 
cognitive load for updating working memory at each 
search event not simply a perceptual salience bias towards 
the flashing locations.
In Longstaffe’s account of revisits drawn from percep-
tual load theory of attention (Lavie, 2005, 2010), revisits 
occur from the need to “tag” previously visited locations in 
working memory that competes for a finite amount of cog-
nitive resources with the perceptual load generated by 
(more salient) flashing locations. Extending Longstaffe’s 
account to consider the rule-congruence of search behav-
iour generates a different hypothesis. That is, if partici-
pants engaged with the flashing rule, searching 
task-relevant locations should be more exclusive towards 
flashing than distractor (static) locations, reducing the cog-
nitive load of search due to the congruence between rule 
and perceptually salient features of the display. Conversely, 
if participants engaged with the static rule, searching task-
relevant locations should be more exclusive to static than 
distractor (flashing) locations. Here, the cognitive load of 
search is higher given the perceptual salience of the dis-
tractor locations. This view predicts that search errors 
would be more likely under conditions of high cognitive 
load, due to the finite recruitment of attentional resources. 
Therefore, more revisits would be induced by the static 
(not flashing) rule. Contrary to this extension of 
Longstaffe’s account, both experiments reported here indi-
cated that the flashing rule led to more revisits, suggesting 
a complex interplay of perceptual salience with the 
demands for cognitive control of resource allocation.
Dual mechanisms of cognitive control that distinguish 
mechanisms of control at different time-points, provide a 
stronger account of navigational search data than previ-
ously advanced by Longstaffe et al. (2014). Proactive con-
trol is a control mechanism which would maintain the 
probabilistic search rule (goal) in working memory, by 
regulating conflict from the stimuli-driven aspects of the 
display and the selection from automatic action schemas 
that enable multiple locations to be visited. In both experi-
ments, search was consistent with the anticipatory mainte-
nance of the probabilistic rule that biased the proportion of 
button presses made to rule-congruent locations. This pro-
vided indirect evidence of proactive control of naviga-
tional search. Reactive control mode co-ordinates 
attentional and cognitive mechanisms to re-orient action 
and perception systems (post-event) towards the goal or 
stimuli context. In the navigational search paradigm, the 
search event offers new information regarding the goal of 
finding the target, requiring cognitive resources to be allo-
cated to updating spatial memory and so guide a new 
action schema that will achieve the search goal. Search 
errors, as revisits to previously visited locations give 
insight to the failure of control process, either in the updat-
ing of spatial memory or in the re-instatement of the search 
goal. As each search location is checked, reactive control 
is mobilised to provide a mechanism for resolving conflict 
between multiple action schemas and the stimulus-driven 
updating of the search environment to re-instate the goal.
The novel variant of the DPE task captured dynamic 
attributes of control mechanisms embedded in motor behav-
iour, even over a relatively small number of trials. Both the 
mouse-tracking variant of the DPE task and the search para-
digm provided complex environments for monitoring and 
generating a motor response to spatial aspects of an environ-
ment, in addition to the demands of updating and regulating 
behaviour in the event of new information. Latency data in 
critical interference trials were sufficiently stable to identify 
modes of cognitive control in two subgroups. Including the 
DPE task therefore allowed a more direct evaluation of 
search behaviour for individuals who were predominantly 
in proactive and reactive control mode. For button presses, 
there was no evidence that control mode biased search for 
the proactive group through a stronger anticipatory ten-
dency towards rule-congruent search behaviour. This could 
imply that instating the rule at the outset, rather than antici-
patory maintenance of the rule was sufficient to bias button 
presses to rule-congruent locations.
Mechanisms of control should be evident in search 
errors, as seen in the pattern of revisits in relation to the 
dominant control mode. If proactive control mode is 
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dominant, we predicted that revisits would be biased 
towards rule-congruent locations since new action sche-
mas are governed by anticipation of the likely location of 
the goal. Since reactive control is diminished in this mode, 
the search errors are more likely to correspond to rules 
with less sensitivity to the task context. The findings were 
consistent with this prediction, as resilience to search 
errors were relatively unbiased. In this mode, maintaining 
and reinstating the relevant rule after each search event, 
without undue distraction from the search environment, 
characterised performance. Where reactive control mode 
is dominant, then we predicted search errors will be less 
sensitive to rule-adherence as new information is updated 
from the search event and with close perceptual monitor-
ing of the display. In Experiment 2, there were more revis-
its to rule-congruent (flashing) locations made by 
participants in reactive control mode implying that closer 
monitoring of perceptually salient flashing locations led to 
more search errors.
In these experiments, the search task varied the per-
ceptual salience of flashing and static locations with a 
consequence for resource allocation (see also Longstaffe 
et al., 2014). Although there was some evidence that 
flashing locations received more revisits overall than 
static locations in Experiment 1, the effect was relatively 
small, compared to the sensitivity to the flashing rule. We 
propose that the greater distraction from monitoring 
flashing locations engages the automatic orientation of 
reactive control towards the stimulus display. By allocat-
ing attention to the perceptual salience of the display 
guided by the flashing rule, potentially in combination 
with weaker updating of working memory for the search 
array, more conflict is generated between action schemas 
that are consistent with the flashing rule, including those 
for previously visited locations. The combination of more 
conflict between action schemas and diminished proac-
tive control that reinstates the search goal for a target at a 
new location, these setting conditions led these partici-
pants in reactive control mode to make more revisits to 
flashing locations. Previous evidence suggests that pro-
active mechanisms are closely associated with the recruit-
ment of working memory resources (Redick, 2014). 
Therefore, under proactive control mode, participants 
were more adept at recruiting and updating working 
memory to support search behaviour, possibly by creat-
ing more opportunity for updating the “tagged” locations 
in working memory. Participants in proactive control 
mode were less attentive to the local features of the dis-
play due to diminished reactive control and generated 
fewer search errors linked to the salience of flashing 
locations.
In conclusion, the evidence suggests that navigational 
search operates through the involvement of cognitive con-
trol processes, as could be expected for an energetic and 
costly exercise that co-ordinates cognitive resources for 
an optimal behavioural outcome. The dual-mechanisms 
framework accounts for the complex pattern of data, as 
well as providing a route to the study of individual bias in 
cognitive control modes. In the present study, the catego-
risation of participants by dominant control mode reflected 
an intra-individual bias that was generated from the task 
context, rather than being a stable factor derived from 
multiple measures or from repeat testing. The sample was 
characteristic of a typical population of young adults, with 
a dominant mode of proactive control. Rather than a sta-
ble trait, dominant mechanisms of control can fluctuate 
over short and immediate time-frames, consistent with 
life skills and training (Arbula et al., 2016; Chang et al., 
2018). Indeed, intra-individual biases in proactive control 
can altered by training, for example, with a cognitive 
intervention over several weeks (e.g., Li et al., 2018). 
Future work should ascertain how shifts between the two 
control modes occur over short and medium time-frames, 
perhaps due to extrinsic factors that alter goal-mainte-
nance or from the meta-cognitive regulation of resource 
allocation (e.g., Chevalier et al., 2015). As some classes of 
navigational search do benefit from training (e.g., Riggs 
et al., 2018), dual mechanisms of control can help explain 
how extrinsic and intrinsic goals can be recruited to serve 
goal-directed behaviour within complex search. More 
insight to how and when mechanisms of cognitive control 
are deployed during navigational search could offer valu-
able support to people with impaired cognitive function, 
especially for simple, everyday challenges, such as find-
ing one’s keys before leaving the house.
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